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THE TOOTHLESS CONVENTION: THE LACK OF POLITICAL
WILL TO UPDATE THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION 
Olivia Bauer 
Real World Observation 
On September 10, 2014, The New York Times reported a stabbing that took 
place in the airport in Lagos, Nigeria. The article continues to say that a federal 
air marshal was stabbed with a syringe, “an incident that is raising concerns 
about whether the deadly Ebola virus could be harvested from the widespread 
outbreak in West Africa and used as a bioweapon.”1 The initial tests done on 
the contents of the syringe do not detect Ebola or any other dangerous bio­
logical agent, and the air marshal was examined and released from a hospital 
in Houston with no sign of sickness. While “experts say it would be extremely 
hard for a group to grow large amounts of the virus and turn it into a weapon 
that could be dispersed over a wide area, [...] it is harder to completely discount 
1 Andrew Pollack. “Stabbing With Syringe in Nigeria Raises Concerns of Ebola as Weapon,” 
The New York Times, September 10 2014 http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/11/world/africa/ 
stabbing-with-syringe-in-nigeria-raises-concerns-of-ebola-as-weapon.html. 
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the possibility of a smaller attack.”2 Ebola is not a particularly contagious virus, 
but it is has a high mortality rate once contracted. Its fatality is clearly seen
in the most heavily affected areas of the Ebola outbreak. As of September 25, 
2014 “at least 2,909 people have died in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, with 
6,242 reported Ebola cases over all, according to the latest report of the United 
Nations’ health body. Nigeria and Senegal have recorded a total of eight deaths 
and 21 cases of infection.”3 The United States government has responded quite 
dramatically to the Ebola outbreak in Africa with an unprecedented commit­
ment of military forces. Dan Lamothe with The Washington Post reported that 
President Obama “framed the ongoing Ebola epidemic in western Africa as a 
potential threat to global security, a two-star Army general and his staff were 
already on the ground in Liberia, preparing for a mission that is expected to 
include about 3,000 service members and has no end in sight.”4 While the reac­
tion on the part of the United States is unprecedented, the threat of biological 
agents and their potential use as biological weapons has existed for some time. 
In recent years, biological agents have been assessed with increasing fre­
quency as having a dangerous and pressing potential for use as weapons. A
recent example occurred in April of 2013, when The New York Times reported, 
“a letter sent to a U.S. Senator from Mississippi tested positive for the poison 
ricin.”5 While the letters were successfully intercepted and analyzed, the exis­
tence of an attack like this one serves to show the progress that still needs to 
be made in eliminating the potential for biological agents to be used against 
citizens, and even states. These domestic attacks are only evidence of the terrify­
ing possibility of an interstate biological weapons attack. Historically, when it 
became clear that biological weapons were a threat to state actors, the Biological 
Weapons Convention (BWC) was written and signed in 1972. In 1975, the 
2 Ibid. 
3  Nick Cumming-Bruce, “Ebola Death Toll Is More Than 2,900, W.H.O. Says,”The New York
Times, September 25, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/26/world/africa/ebola-death-toll­
is-more-than-2900-who-says.html. 
4 Dan Lamothe, “Meet the New U.S. Military Force that Obama is Deploying to Fight Ebola,” 
The Washington Post, September 16, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/ 
wp/2014/09/16/meet-the-new-u-s-military-force-that-obama-is-deploying-to-fight-ebola/. 
5 Jonathan Weisman, “Letter Mailed to Senator Tests Positive for Ricin,” The New York Times, 
April 16, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/17/us/politics/toxic-ricin-detected-on-mail­
sent-to-senator.html?_r=0. 
44 
         
 
           
         
            
         
       
            
     
           
         
         
 
           
  
   
           
  
Olivia Bauer 
United States ratified the BWC, and today, there are 165 signatory states. The 
State Department defines “the BWC [as being] critical to international efforts 
to address the threat posed by biological weapons—whether in the hands of 
governments or non-state actors—and to remain effective it must continue 
to adapt to the wider range of biological threats we face in the 21st century.”6 
However, in the years since its ratification, the BWC has not been updated or 
given teeth, despite the increased threat of a biological weapons attack. This 
leads to the following research question: Why is there a lack of political will to 
update the Biological Weapons Convention? 
Theoretical Paradigm 
International Legal Realism is the theoretical paradigm that best frames the
research question and its potential answers. International Legal Realism assumes 
that states wield power through rules and laws that govern behavior between 
nations. This paradigm also assumes that change occurs on the international 
stage when prompted by a state with relative power. The three main proponents 
and founders of International Legal Realism are Hans Morgenthau, Harold 
Lasswell, and Myres McDougal. Hans Morgenthau explains that international 
laws need “to be seen within the sociological context of economic interests, so­
cial tensions, and aspirations for power, which are the motivating forces in the 
international field, and which give rise to the factual situations forming the raw 
material for regulation by international law.”7 Relating to the core assumptions, 
this standard for international laws explains that relative power is what controls 
and drives outcomes on the international level. Similarly, Lasswell “defined 
politics as the adversarial process of decision about the distribution of values 
in society.”8 Furthermore, Lasswell and McDougal together “defined law as the 
subset of the flow of decisions that could be said to be both ‘authoritative’ and 
‘effective.’”9 Effective in this case is defined as controlling with power. Clearly, 
from the definitions given by the three founders of the paradigm, relative 
6 “Biological Weapons Convention (BWC),” U.S. Department of State. http://www.state.gov/t/ 
isn/bw/. 
7  Hans J. Morgenthau, “Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law,” The American 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 32, no. 2 (April 1940): 260-284. 
8 Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, “International Law and International Relations Theory: A 
Dual Agenda,” The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 87, no. 2 (April 1993): 205-239. 
9 Ibid. 
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power is crucial to interstate behavior and outcomes on the international stage. 
These assumptions are the reason why International Legal Realism best 
frames this research question and its answer. Lasswell and McDougal, in their 
“Criteria For a Theory About Law,” state that “an emphasis explicitly focused 
upon the institutions of the modern state […], unable to observe in the world 
arena either appropriate centralized institutions or an identifiable monopoly of 
force, has insoluble difficulty in accounting for the patterns of authority and 
control transcending nation-state lines.”10 The BWC can certainly be classified 
as an institution of the modern state, but more specifically, it lacks verifica­
tion or centralization. Without teeth or hard international law, there can be 
no concrete authority or enforcement on an issue such as biological weapons. 
This aspect of the theoretical paradigm relates to the first case study, which 
focuses on the Biological Weapons Convention Verification Protocol. The 
paradigm also frames the threat inflation case study through its assumptions 
about interaction between states and the role of power. Threat inflation in the 
case of biological weapons reflects the more abstract concept that is the shift 
to a unipolar international system. Lasswell and McDougal “emphasize that 
law as an on-going process is located in a larger social context […] and legal 
problems are generally attributable to the broader social setting,” described as 
the big blooming ongoing confusion, “in which they always occur.”11 Finally, 
as it applies to the final case study, the decline in arms control, International 
Legal Realism explains that the state with the most power drives change. Change 
in this final case study is a shift from arms control to nonproliferation, or the 
prevention of the spread of weapons like biological weapons. The United States 
set the precedent for other nations to adopt a defeatist policy when it comes 
to biological weapons control. However, this assumption of International 
Legal Realism also applies to the larger picture of the research question. “The 
Lasswell-McDougal approach was designed to develop social policies through 
careful and rigorously organized theoretical deliberation.”12 While a shift in 
outlook on biological weapons can be standardized by the United States, the 
10 Myres S. McDougal and Harold D. Lasswell, “Criteria for a Theory About Law,” Yale 
Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1967. http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu. 
11 John Norton Moore, “Prolegomenon to the Jurisprudence of Myres McDougal and 
Harold Lasswell,” Virginia Law Review, Vol. 54, no. 4 (May 1968): 662-688. 
12 Derek McDougall, “Harold D. Lasswell and the Study of International Relations,” 
Political Psychology, Vol. 7, no. 4 (December 1986): 789-791. 
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development of a solution to the BWC issue can as well. 
Failure to Implement the Biological Weapons Convention 
The Biological Weapons Convention’s failed Verification Protocol and other 
similar attempts serve as empirical instances that represent a broader and more
abstract concept. In the exploration of a reason for lack of political will to 
update the BWC, an important idea that often comes up is the concept of 
sovereignty and the desire of states to keep their relative power unchecked. 
The Verification Protocol and its failed ratification by the United States is an 
excellent representation of this independent variable, which may be causing 
a lack of political will among states to redo the BWC in a way that gives it 
teeth, which the Verification Protocol would have accomplished. The BWC 
was written and negotiated from 1969 to 1971, opened for signing in 1972, 
and was ratified by 43 countries by the time that the United States ratified it 
in 1975. The biological weapons treaty “prohibits the development, produc­
tion, stockpiling or acquisition by other means or retention of microbial or 
other biological agents, or toxins.”13 However, dating back to the creation of 
the BWC, efforts to strengthen its policies and give it some force have been 
fairly unsuccessful and, some say, even half-hearted. A couple of fairly obvious 
barriers became apparent when the BWC entered its negotiation phase. One 
such obstacle “lies in the dual-use nature of the materials, equipment, and 
know-how fundamental to legitimate research laboratories and multinational 
industries. Avenues to biological weapons cannot be completely closed off 
without sacrificing the beneficial science […] that depend on these dual-use 
items.”14 The more troublesome impediment is the effect that enforcement
would have on states’ sovereignty. From this obstacle stems a long history of 
paradoxical statements and actions in the United States. 
Even in the process of its negotiation, the BWC proved difficult for the two 
world superpowers at the time—the United States and the Soviet Union—to 
agree to under certain provisions that would leave them vulnerable to sover­
eignty infringement. The dichotomy between support of the BWC and desire to 
13  Kalpana Chittaranjan, “Verification Protocol: A Must for BWC Effectiveness,” Strategic 
Analysis: A Monthly Journal of the IDSA, Vol. 23, no. 6 (September 1999). 
14  Amy E. Smithson, “Biological Weapons: Can Fear Overwhelm Inaction?” Washington 
Quarterly, Vol. 28, no. 1 (2004-2005): 165-178. 
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maintain control over defense and military research and development surfaced 
in the negotiation period of the convention. In a memorandum to President 
Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger informed the President “we have supported 
negotiation of a prohibition on biological weapons and toxins along the lines 
of the 1969 UK draft convention.”15 Later in the same memorandum, Kissinger 
implied that intrusive investigations into states’ activities involving biological 
weapons programs should be avoided.16 According to Jonathan B. Tucker of 
the Arms Control Association, “by the time the Cold War superpowers finished 
reworking the BWC, they had dropped all formal verification provisions, […] 
enabling Moscow and Washington to use their veto power to block inquiries 
into their own activities or those of their allies.”17 Though a formal verification 
protocol was yet to be established, the United States and Soviet Union both 
clearly opposed intrusive investigations by the BWC even at the risk of crip­
pling the convention. 
In the first few years after the ratification of the BWC, “the participating 
states tried to strengthen the convention by establishing several politically 
binding confidence-building measures (CBMs), including annual declarations 
of high-containment biological facilities designed for work with dangerous 
microorganisms, and reports of unusual disease outbreaks.”18 However, the 
lack of penalty for abiding by these CBMs led to a ridiculously low number of 
states that upheld them. Similarly, “Article IV of the treaty requires member 
states to pass domestic legislation that would penalize bioterrorists operating 
within their borders by outlawing offensive biological weapons activities.”19 A 
similarly low number of states adhered to this policy. Finally, “at the Third 
BWC Review Conference, European countries sought a rigorous and intrusive 
on-site inspection regime analogous to the one then being elaborated for the 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).”20 In response, the United States 
15 Henry Kissinger, “Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security 
Affairs to President Nixon,” (Office of the Historian, Washington, April 28, 1971). http://history. 
state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve02/d225. 
16 Ibid. 
17  Jonathan B. Tucker, “Biological Weapons Breakdown,” Arms Control Association (May 
2005). 
18 Op. Cit. , fn. 14 
19 Op. Cit. , fn. 15 
20 Milton Leitenberg, “Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism in the First Years of the 
Twenty-First Century,” Politics and the Life Sciences, Vol. 21, no. 2 (September 2002): 3-27. 
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along with Iran, Russia, and others opposed this proposed protocol due to its 
potential infringement on these states’ ability to research biological defense. 
“The American negotiating position on a verification protocol had been driven 
by restrictions desired by the Department of Defense, […] apparently trying to 
prevent the exposure of biodefense activities taking place in the United States.”21 
Following the United States’ adamant refusal of on-site investigations, it became 
clear that the BWC was going to deteriorate without any hard law to support it. 
From this point on, a pattern among Presidents of the United States ap­
peared in which their public statements on the BWC expressed clear support 
and steadfast commitment to its strengthening, while their archival documents 
revealed serious hesitation about allowing any form of verification that may give 
teeth to the treaty. In a report to the National Security Council in 1970, the 
Interdepartmental Political-Military Group asked, “Should the U.S. maintain 
an option to develop capabilities to retaliate with toxins against chemical or 
biological attack?”22 Presidents, advisors, and other officials have continually 
asked this question throughout the years since the creation and ratification of 
the BWC, and it seems that their actions answer in the affirmative. On February 
16, 1995, President Bill Clinton sent a message to Congress saying, “The United 
States was an active participant in the Special Conference of States Parties [and] 
the Special Conference produced a mandate to establish an Ad Hoc Group 
whose objective is to develop a legally binding instrument to strengthen the 
effectiveness and improve the implementation of the BWC.”23 In actuality, the 
Ad Hoc Group, also known as verification experts or VEREX, only encouraged 
off-site surveillance that did little beyond create suspicion among party states.24 
While President George W. Bush made a similar statement supporting the 
strengthening of the BWC in November of 2001,25 in July of 2001, he “decided 
21 Ibid. 
22 “Report Prepared by the Interdepartmental Political-Military Group,” (Office of 
the Historian, Washington, January 30, 1970), http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/ 
frus1969-76ve02/d177. 
23  William J. Clinton, “Message to the Congress Reporting on the Proliferation of
Chemical Biological Weapons,” (The American Presidency Project, February 16, 1995), http:// 
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=50989&st=biological+weapons+convention&st1=. 
24 Op. Cit. , fn. 20 
25  George W. Bush, “Statement on Strengthening the International Regime Against
Biological Weapons,” (The American presidency Project, November 1, 2001). http://www.presi­
dency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=64647&st=biological+weapons+convention&st1=. 
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not to sign the protocol to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention by 
providing monitoring and compliance provisions, citing the administration’s 
doubts about the ability to verify compliance with the treaty and its concerns 
about [its] impact.”26 Bush’s policy has bled over into the Obama administration, 
which has done nothing to further the verification process of the BWC. It is 
clear from this string of presidential decisions and statements that sovereignty 
plays a large role in the lack of political will to update the Biological Weapons 
Convention. With that said, other factors are also very influential in hindering 
political will and action regarding the convention. 
Threat Inflation of Bioterrorism 
This second case study aims to represent the shift to a unipolar world in the 
international system. The rise of the United States and the fall of the Soviet 
Union after the Cold War brought about the shift from a bipolar to unipolar 
world. As Detlev F. Vagts stated in his piece on Hegemonic International Law, 
“America is in a position to reshape norms, alter expectations and create new 
realities.”27 America’s unique position is due to its role as the hegemon on the 
global stage. Yet, this ability also comes with responsibilities and, perhaps 
more importantly, risks. As the political and military leader of the world, the 
United States constantly runs the risk of being targeted or seen as being too 
powerful. For this reason, the United States government must constantly be 
concerned with the threat of attack while simultaneously working to avoid 
a security dilemma, in which an adversary state becomes threatened by the 
United States’ increase in military capabilities, and in turn, increases its own 
capabilities, creating a cycle of paranoia and security expansion. 
In regards to biological weapons, American citizens and officials alike see 
the threat of bioterrorism as a menacing possibility. The intuitive assumption 
regarding the connection between threat inflation and action to update the 
BWC is that due to the expanded threat, the United States should be more 
inclined to promote the restraint of biological weapons development elsewhere 
in the world. It also seems quite possible that as a result of the threat, the United 
26 Dr. Robert A. Wampler, “The Nixon Administration’s Decision to End U.S. Biological 
Warfare Programs,” The National Security Archive I, Vol. 3, no. 58 (December 2001). 
27  Detlev F. Vagts, “Hegemonic International Law,” American Society of International 
Law, Vol. 95, no. 4 (October 2001: 843-848. 
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States would want to maintain its own biological capabilities. In an article on 
arms control, Jack Beard explains, “a state actor is unlikely to forgo a particu­
lar class of weapons permanently unless it receives assurances that adversary 
states are reciprocally so committed and an effective monitoring regime is in 
place to ensure against a ‘surprise defection,’ that is, cheating.”28 If this is the 
case, then the threat inflation of bioterrorism certainly could be affecting the 
lack of political will to update the BWC. Before that can be determined, it is 
important to analyze the perceived threat. 
First, the presidential archives show that the threat of biological weapons 
has been a pressing matter since the development of such weapons. However, 
over the years, presidents became increasingly worried and behaved more cau­
tiously on the matter. President George Bush Sr. stated, “On November 16, 
1990, in Executive Order No. 12735, I declared a national emergency under 
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act […] to deal with the threat 
to the national security and foreign policy of the United States caused by the 
proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.”29 In November of 1993, 
President Bill Clinton “extended the national emergency on the basis that
the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons [continued] to pose an 
unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of 
the United States.”30 At this point in time, the major terrorist attacks of 2001, 
which include the anthrax attacks and September 11th attacks, had not yet 
occurred. This implies that the threat was inflated before there was any real 
tangible cause for concern. 
More recently, in 2002, Defense Horizons published a piece explaining 
that “the current state of U.S. knowledge tells us that: almost any potential 
U.S. military adversary either has biological weapons or has a program to get 
28 Jack M. Beard, “The Shortcomings of Indeterminacy in Arms Control Regimes: The 
Case of the Biological Weapons Convention,” American Society of International Law, Vol. 101, no. 
2 (April 2007): 271-321. 
29 George Bush, “Message to the Congress Reporting on the National Emergency With 
Respect to Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation,” (The American Presidency Project, 
June 21, 1991), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=19716&st=biological+weap 
ons+convention&st1=. 
30 William J. Clinton, “Message to the Congress Reporting on Chemical and Biological 
Weapons Proliferation,” (The American Presidency Project, May 23, 1994), http://www.presidency. 
ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=50230&st=biological+weapons+convention&st1=. 
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them [, and] technology is changing rapidly and […] offering more state and 
non-state actors the means to exploit biological processes for military ends.”31 
Similarly, an article on biological warfare from The National Security Archive 
from 2001 warns that terrorists may have access to even eradicated biological 
agents, such as smallpox.32 In 2011, the Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of 
International Security and Nonproliferation stated, “We fully recognize that a 
major biological attack on one of the world’s major cities could cause as much 
death and economic and psychological damage as a nuclear attack.”33 From
this history of threat inflation, it is evident that the threat has at least remained 
constant, if not increased, over time. 
A good portion of this expanded threat comes from the uncertainty and 
suspicion about the activities of other states. The National Security Council 
released a document stating, “Distinguishing illicit intent within the expanse 
of legitimate activity presents a unique challenge. It is quite possible that we 
would not obtain specific warning of an imminent threat or impending attack 
in time to stop it.”34 In reaction to this fear, the United States has taken more 
aggressive strategies in the past. “Justification for the 2003 invasion of Iraq 
included the immediate threat posed by Iraq’s purportedly resurgent weapons 
programs.”35 Of course, the United States cannot simply invade every nation 
suspected of expanding their biological weapons programs. Unfortunately, 
government officials do not see verification of the BWC as a potential solu­
tion. A National Security Council official stated, “The [verification] protocol 
does not stop the threat posed by the spread of biological weapons […] but 
the protocol’s requirement that states declare facilities in which weapons are 
made and permit them to be inspected does put our bio-defense activities 
[…] at risk.”36 This statement clearly sums up the entirety of threat inflation’s 
effect on lack of political will to redo the BWC. Without the ability to protect 
31 Brad Roberts and Michael Moodie, “ Biological Weapons: Towards a Threat Reduction 
Strategy,” Defense Horizons, Vol. 1, no. 15 (July 2002). 
32 Op. Cit. , fn. 26 
33 Thomas Countryman, “Biological Weapons Convention: the Next Five Years,” (Remarks, 
Pittsburgh, PA, October 4, 2011), http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/rm/175121.htm. 
34 “National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats,” (National Security Council, 
Washington, November 23, 2009), http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/cbw/strategy2009.pdf. 
35 Op. Cit. , fn. 14 
36 Op. Cit. , fn. 20 
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itself, the United States sees the risks as being too high to chance a last minute 
withdrawal from a renewed and enforced Biological Weapons Convention by 
an adversary state. 
Decline in Arms Control 
This third case study considers the concept of a paradigm shift between inter­
national relations theorists and government officials, in which nonproliferation 
replaces arms control. Arms control is considered a form of hard law, whereas 
nonproliferation is considered a form of soft law, also known as a gentleman’s 
agreement. This shift represents a type of defeatist attitude towards control of 
state and non-state actors with access to biological weapons. Biological weapons 
proliferation and the likelihood for their use has been deemed “too intractable” 
to be easily fixed.37 The overall decline in arms control, and its replacement 
with nonproliferation strategies, has affected the lack of political will to update 
the BWC because strengthening the convention would be following a hard law 
and thus, the arms control approach. Just as with threat inflation, evidence 
of the decline of arms control is apparent in archival documents as well as 
scholarly works. 
In pieces written on and about the Verification Protocol, many references 
were made to the effect that the protocol would utilize an arms control approach. 
In September of 2000, Dr. Susan Koch of the Department of Defense stated, 
“we do not believe that the Protocol being negotiated will be able to provide the
kind of effective verification that exists in other arms control treaties.”38 However, 
the Verification Protocol would have used more of an arms control strategy than 
has ever been applied regarding the BWC. Such a statement by the Secretary of 
Defense seems to signal a turning point in the recent history of arms control 
decline. More recently, “between 2007 and 2010, the Biological Weapons 
Convention Work Program resumed its focus on biosafety and pathogen se­
curity, national implementation and codes of conduct for scientists, and also 
focused on disease surveillance capacity building and assistance in the event of a 
suspicious outbreak or alleged use of BW.”39 Interestingly, the majority of these 
37  Lynn M. Hansen, “Biological and Toxin Weapons: Arms Control, Stability, and
Western Security,” Association for Politics and Life Sciences, Vol. 9, no. 1 (August 1990): 47-58. 
38 Op. Cit. , fn. 20 
39 Op. Cit. , fn. 33 
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new goals for the BWC are domestic, and only “surveillance capacity building” 
would have any effect on foreign states. In the new biosecurity strategy revealed 
after the Seventh Review of the Biological Weapons Convention, the Obama 
Administration “views the role of the government as supporting this organic, 
bottom-up process by conducting outreach to raise awareness, promoting 
dialogue among the various stakeholders, […] supporting community-based 
approaches to identifying and addressing irresponsible conduct,” and essentially 
establishing a new set of ethics around the issue.40 Again, there is a huge gap 
between this new policy’s strategy and the arms control strategies of the Nixon 
era, when biological weapons and research first affected national security.41 
The decline in arms control that is evident from the recent history of records 
and scholarly works certainly is affecting the lack of political will to update 
the BWC. Even in the formation and negotiating of the BWC, there was a
clear lacking of hard law that would have allowed for nations like the United 
States to enforce violations of the treaty. In addition to avoiding intrusive 
development investigations, the United States and other world powers chose 
to form the final draft of the BWC with “soft structure” as opposed to “hard 
legally binding obligation.”42 States adhered to these weak policies even when 
blatant violations occurred, such as the anthrax outbreak at a research facility 
in Sverdlovsk, Russia in 1979.43 Seeing as no intervention or real arms control 
was required by the BWC, the United States did nothing more than make a 
statement on the matter. In a speech to the United Nations General Assembly 
in 1982, President Ronald Reagan stated, “The Soviet Union and their allies 
are violating the Geneva Protocol of 1925, related rules of international law, 
and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention.”44 Without the obligation to 
intervene, the United States was able to take a much less costly route in “dealing” 
40 Gregory D. Koblentz, “From Biodefense to Biosecurity: the Obama Administration’s 
Strategy for Countering Biological Threats,” International Affairs, Vol. 88, no. 1 (January 2012): 
131-148. 
41 “Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation,” (Press Release, Office of the 
Historian, September 19, 2007), http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve02/ 
pressrelease. 
42 Op. Cit. , fn. 28 
43 Op. Cit. , fn. 37 
44 Ronald Wilson Reagan, “Speech to the United Nations General Assembly,” (speech, 
Miller Center, June 17, 1982), http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/5450. 
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with the issue. For this reason, the decline in arms control is influencing political
will in regards to the Biological Weapons Convention. If states like the United 
States have a choice to do nothing, thereby saving resources, time, money, and 
protecting their sovereignty, they would have no reason to attempt to change 
this reality. 
On the other hand, some theorists argue that soft law can be just as effec­
tive as hard law in negotiating and deterring states. In the case of biological 
weapons, this means that nonproliferation should, in theory, be as effective as 
arms control. As is evident by past violations of the BWC, this is not the case. 
“In spite of the many proponents and purported advantages of soft law in other 
contexts, its indeterminate dimension appears to be a dangerous choice for a 
design element in multilateral disarmament regimes, particularly when member 
states face acute security dilemmas and effective transparency measures are not 
available.”45 
While this is playing out to be true, the United States government continues 
to follow this policy of anti-arms control. Brad Roberts and Michael Moodie 
of Defense Horizons stated, “When deterrence strategies prove unreliable in 
dissuading a U.S. adversary from preparing or conducting BW attacks on
its forces or interests, the focus of U.S. efforts must shift to prevention.”46 It 
seems as though hard law and arms control are a thing of the past, specifically 
in relation to biological weapons. In its place, soft law and talk of prevention 
and influence aim to get the job done. 
Implications 
There is no doubt that political will is seriously lacking on the issue of biological 
weapons and the Biological Weapons Convention. However, it is not without 
reason. The United States, along with the other world powers at this moment in
history, have a few prominent obstacles to overcome before any serious changes 
can be made to foreign policy. The research discussed demonstrates that avoid­
ance of verification measures, threat inflation of bioterrorism, and the decline 
in arms control strategy are affecting political will on this topic. Something 
must change for the safety of not only the United States, but also the nations 
of the world. With swiftly advancing technologies in the biotechnological field, 
45 Op. Cit. , fn. 28 
46 Op. Cit. , fn. 31 
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the threat of biological warfare, while inflated, remains serious and frightening. 
The prospect of a biological attack on any nation is a horrifying and fearsome 
image that must be prevented from turning into a reality. Unfortunately, without 
compromise by powerful nations on the international stage, bioterrorism and 
interstate attacks could become an actuality. 
In order to overcome these obstacles, powerful states will need to set a 
precedent for the rest of the international community. While The Independent
variables examined are evident and do affect political will on the issue of bio­
logical weapons and the BWC, there are ways of influencing and overcoming 
them for the greater good of the world. For example, desire for full sovereignty 
and for maximization of capabilities must be decreased in order to give the 
BWC some form of validation and enforcement. This means that nations like 
the United States will need to take risks and forgo some of their sovereignty for 
the safety of the global population. In regards to threat inflation, the United 
States will probably remain hegemonic in a unipolar international system for the 
foreseeable future. However, by cooperating and compromising with other world 
powers, the United States can diminish the perceived threat of bioterrorism 
and biological attacks to a reasonable level, allowing for the further develop­
ment and strengthening of the BWC. Finally, the United States must return 
to an arms control strategy. It is clear from recent efforts and policy changes 
that soft law alone cannot change and restrain the dangers that threaten the 
international stage and its actors. A combination of nonproliferation and arms 
control could potentially reduce the threat. Since the emergence of biological 
weapons as a viable form of warfare and weaponry, technologies have changed 
rapidly and so, too, should the laws used to restrain them. 
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